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As  of 2014,  the  Estonian  Health  Insurance  Fund  has adopted  new  purchasing  procedures
and  criteria,  which  it now  has started  to implement  in  specialist  care.  Main  changes  include
(1)  redeﬁned  access  criteria  based  on population  need  rather  than  historical  supply,  which
aim  to  achieve  more  equal  access  of  providers  and  specialties;  (2)  stricter  deﬁnition  and
use of  optimal  workload  criteria  to increase  the concentration  of specialist  care  (3) better
consideration of  patient  movement;  and  (4)  an  increased  emphasis  on quality  to  foster
quality  improvement.  The  new  criteria were  ﬁrst used  in  the  contract  cycle  that started
in 2014  and  resulted  in  fewer  contracted  providers  for a similar  volume  of care  compared
to the  previous  contract  cycle.  This  implies  that  provision  of  specialized  care  has  become
concentrated  at fewer  providers.  It is  too  early  to draw  ﬁrm  conclusions  on the  impactstonia on care  quality  or on  actors,  but  the process  has  sparked  debate  on  the  role  of selective
contracting  and  the  role  of  public  and  private  providers  in  Estonian  health  care.  Lastly,  the
Estonian  experience  may  hold  important  lessons  for other  countries  looking  to  overcome
inequalities  in  access  while  concentrating  care  and  improving  care  quality.
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. Introduction
The Health Insurance Act stipulates that the Estonian
ealth Insurance Fund (EHIF), the core purchaser of health
ervices in Estonia, is not obliged to contract all health
are providers operating in Estonia. Since 2002 the EHIF
as developed a transparent contracting process and intro-
uced criteria for selecting the best providers in terms of
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quality and cost [1]. Health care providers are contracted
for at least three-years. The last contract cycle for inpatient
and outpatient specialist as well as nursing care ended in
the ﬁrst quarter of 2014. This provided an opportunity to
revise the selective contracting criteria so that they would
better respond to changes in the health care delivery sys-
tem and population needs, but also to further prioritize
providers with a higher quality of care. The changes needed
to address the increasing role of family medicine based
primary care with a gradual increase of gatekeeping and
coordinating prevention and care [2]; the concentration
of higher level specialist care; and an increased capac-
ity of the Hospital Network Development Plan (HNDP)
hospitals due to the EU structural funds investments.
Unsurprisingly, these developments have had signiﬁ-
cant repercussions for the EHIF’s strategic purchasing
policy.
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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specialist care of good quality there is need for high-tech
equipment and access to supportive medical services such
as laboratories and radiology. It is assumed that this can be1012 T. Habicht et al. / Health
Strategic purchasing, or active purchasing, in contrast
to passive purchasing (e.g., use of historical budgets), can
be seen as the main instrument for promoting efﬁciency in
the use of health funds [3]. It should promote quality and
efﬁciency by among others examining actual health needs
and their regional variations, the interventions and services
that best meet these needs, and how these interventions
and services should be purchased or provided while taking
into account the availability of providers and their qual-
ity [4]. Today, many countries are grappling with these
issues and seek to develop the expertise and systems to
implement an effective strategic purchasing policy [5].
This paper aims to describe the main changes in pur-
chasing of specialist inpatient and outpatient care in
Estonia. Moreover, it examines its results so far and its
impact on stakeholders. In the conclusion we focus on the
long-term impact of this new contracting policy and some
lessons for other countries.
2. The purchasing process in Estonia
Selective contracting was introduced in 2002 to ensure
timely and geographical access to care in locations and spe-
cialties where HNDP hospitals, which are not selectively
contracted, have limited capacity and long waiting times
exist. Furthermore, it was intended to introduce more
competition into health care provision, increase choice,
improve service quality and allow contracting of private
providers. The process applies a set of deﬁned criteria in
line with the Administrative Procedure Act and the Health
Insurance Act. Selected providers receive contracts for a
minimum period of three years.
At the beginning of each year the EHIF negotiates capped
cost and volume contracts with hospitals [1]. The contract’s
framework covers medium-term conditions for ﬁve years
for HNDP hospitals [6] and at least three years for other
selected providers. The EHIF only contracts providers that
are licensed by the Health Board. The EHIF is required
to contract all HNDP hospitals (19 state- or municipality-
owned acute care hospitals working under private law).
The negotiation process determines the volume of care
these hospitals are allowed to provide in a certain location.
HNDP hospitals provide outpatient and inpatient specialist
care but also nursing care and some also dental care [7].
The rationale behind this is that these hospitals need to be
contracted to guarantee geographical access to a minimum
level of specialist care and 24/7 emergency care. The HNDP
2015 has its origins in the Hospital Master Plan (HMP) com-
missioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) with
ﬁnancial support from the World Bank. It was prepared
by Swedish consultants and aimed to plan an efﬁcient
future hospital network. In 2003, the government eventu-
ally adopted it as the HNDP. Among others, it categorized
hospitals into regional, central, general and local according
to the range of services provided and required that a hos-
pital should be within 60 min  travel time by car (70 km)
[1].In 2013 the EHIF had contracts with 167 specialist care
providers in total, including 19 HNDP hospitals, which
means that 148 have been selectively contracted. In dental
care the number of selected providers is 338 and in nursing119 (2015) 1011–1016
care 60. However, in terms of turnover, selected providers
account for a relatively small share (8%) of the specialist
care budget. In contrast, this share is much higher in dental
care (88%) and nursing care (46%). These shares have been
stable since the early 2000s.1
The new contract cycle for specialist care providers
started in April 2014 and will last for four years and
one quarter. The formal selection process started in late
2013 and covers important innovations in geographical
access criteria, which are used for planning and selective
contracting, and a stronger emphasis on quality criteria
in contracting. The new criteria were published about
2 month before launching the selection process, which
means that there was  little time for stakeholders to adapt
to the new situation.
2.1. New geographical accessibility criteria
According to the Health Insurance Act, access to health
care services has to be equal in all regions of Estonia. This
principle is the basis for the EHIF when deﬁning its pur-
chasing policy and its contracting process. Access to care
is monitored in two dimensions: timely access and geo-
graphical access. Timely access is measured with the time
an individual has to wait to receive necessary care, which
is reported monthly by providers to EHIF. Geographical
accessibility, meaning which services should be available
in which location, had not been explicitly deﬁned until
recently. Some elements of the latter are reﬂected in the
ministerial level decree on requirements on hospital types,
which sets minimum and maximum levels of specialties
that have to be available by hospital types [1]. However,
these requirements are set for the provider rather than its
geographical area and have not been systematically revised
since the mid  2000s. Therefore, the EHIF had to develop
own  geographical accessibility criteria to be used for annual
contract planning and also as a basis for selective contract-
ing.
Geographical accessibility criteria were ﬁrst deﬁned
for outpatient specialist care. It was  assumed that ser-
vice provision of good quality could be achieved if doctors
perform a certain minimum amount of services in their
provision area. The areas were deﬁned as counties (15
in total), because historically each county had at least
one strategic hospital. The minimum workload per one
county was  then deﬁned as the amount of services and
the corresponding number of full time equivalent special-
ists needed to deliver these services. The assumption is
that one full-time equivalent doctor works 225 days per
year, 7 h per day and that one appointment with a patient
lasts on average 20 min. Furthermore, to best utilize lim-
ited human resources, deﬁning a minimum workload per
location should avoid fragmentation of their working time
over different locations. Moreover, to provide outpatient1 This data comes from (unpublished) EHIF internal information to
which the ﬁrst author has exclusive access
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rranged more efﬁciently if there is sufﬁcient workload per
ocation.
To guarantee an optimal organization of care provision,
our levels of access were deﬁned for outpatient special-
st care, which closely relate to the complexity of the care
nd disease prevalence (see Fig. 1). The ﬁrst level includes
are and very complex care that is made accessible in one
ocation in Estonia–Tallinn or Tartu (e.g., organ transplan-
ations). Services at the second level have to be accessible
n two locations – Tallinn and Tartu (e.g., oncology, car-
iac surgery, neurosurgery, and vascular surgery). At the
hird level there are services that have to be available in
our biggest counties – Tallinn, Pärnu, Tartu and Ida-Viru
e.g., urology, endocrinology, gastroenterology, cardiology,
heumatology, neurology, orthopedics, and pulmonology).
he fourth level includes the most common care types and
ncludes specialties that have to be accessible at county
evel (e.g., general surgery, otorhinolaryngology, ophthal-
ology, gynecology, dermatovenerology, and psychiatry).
.2. Implementing the criteria for contracting
The new criteria were integrated in the outpatient spe-
ialist care providers’ selection process in 2014 and used
s baseline for the contracts (see Fig. 2). The EHIF has
mplemented this within the boundaries of the existing
ramework consisting of the Health Services Organiza-
ion Act (in force since 2002), which deﬁnes the types
f hospitals and licensing procedures, and a Ministry of
ocial Affairs regulation stating the requirements as list
nd scale of services to be provided and the care stan-
ards [7]. These provider-level standards set minimum and
aximum standards for medical specialties that have toss to outpatient specialist care.
be accessible in each hospital type. These standards give
providers opportunities to develop medical areas that have
a rather low volume of care compared to the maximum
stated level.
The EHIF estimates population need for health services
based on historical patient-level service utilization by spe-
cialties and by counties but limiting this to −/+10% of
the Estonian average. Additionally, some regional charac-
teristics such as population density (regions with higher
population density have higher outpatient care shares
compared to inpatient care) and also whether the area is an
island or not are included. In practice, high-density regions
may  be 6% above the Estonian average while low-density
regions may  be 11% below the Estonian average. Thus if
average population need is 100, the variation may  range
between 90 and 110 in a county with average population
density. If the county is high-density, population need may
be as high as (100 + 10 + 6 = ) 116, while in a low-density
county this number could be as low as (100 − 10 − 11 = )
79. With this information, the needed levels of service
provision are calculated taking into account patient mobil-
ity between counties and evaluated against geographical
accessibility criteria (see Section 2.1.). This results in an
estimation of service volumes needed per specialty and
county. Next, the EHIF uses this as a basis for negotiations
with HNDP hospitals. If the HNDP hospital does not have
sufﬁcient capacity to cover the need for specialized ser-
vices for a certain county and according to the geographical
accessibility criteria services of that particular specialty,
the remaining need for services is veriﬁed against opti-
mal  workload criteria. If the remaining need for services
is at least 50% of a full-time equivalent optimal workload,
the EHIF opens public tender to select providers. Below
1014 T. Habicht et al. / Health Policy 
Box 1: Estimating the need for outpatient gas-
troenterology care in Tartu County (example)
Using historical patient-level utilization patterns in
Estonia adjusted to the Estonian average and adjusted
for regional characteristics, the estimated need for out-
patient gastroenterology care (a third level specialty
thus only available in 4 counties including Tartu) of
the population living in Tartu County was 3473 treat-
ment cases in 2014. Of this need, 3376 treatment cases
are provided in Tartu County while the rest go to
another county. In addition, 2197 treatment cases were
provided to patients living in a county that does not
have to provide these services and thus have to travel
to Tartu County. In total the need for gastroenterol-
ogy in Tartu County is 5573 (3376 + 2197) treatment
cases. The HNDP hospital in Tartu is able to cover 4096
treatment cases (based on historical data and hospi-
tals own assessment), which leaves a remaining need
of 1477 treatment cases. An average patient has 1.6
visits, lasting 20 min  (1/3 hrs). This means 1477 × 1.6
visits × 1/3 h = 788 h. The optimal workload per one
FTE is 225 days × 7 h = 1575 h per year. This implies
that the remaining workload is 788/1575 = 0.5 FTE, i.e.,
the minimum amount for the EHIF to start a public
tender.
50%, the amount of services is deemed too small to have
efﬁcient provision (see Box 1 for an example). This evalua-
tion was done for each outpatient specialty for each county
before opening public tender. In daycare and inpatient care,
where the role of providers outside the HNDP is minimal,
the evaluation procedure was similar.
2.3. More emphasis on contracting quality of care
The objective of the contracting process is to select the
best care providers. Obviously, the new workload crite-
ria are hoped to concentrate specialist care and achieve
an improvement in care quality, although international
evidence on this relationship is so far inconclusive [8]. Com-
pared to the previous selection process, which assesses bids
on price and quality, the greatest change is the increased
weight awarded to quality. The assessment procedure
deﬁnes the weighting of each individual quality criterion
(see Table 1) and also how each provider making a bid
must measure these criteria. Additionally, providers using
Table 1
Quality criteria used for specialist care purchasing in Estonia (example for genera
Criteria Weight (maxim
Lower price 10 
Penalties 10 
Arrears of taxes 10 
Corrective actions by Health Board 3 
Petitions to the expert commission on quality of care 4 
Connection to E-Health system 4 
Share  of accredited doctors 10 
Comprehensive care provision 10 
Share  of surgeons who  have been doing surgeries 10 
Share  of diagnostic tests and procedures 10 
Share  of doctors working in inpatient care setting 10 
Workload 10 119 (2015) 1011–1016
the national e-health system received extra points. If two
providers receive equal total points, the new procedure
stipulates that the provider receiving more points for qual-
ity criteria will be contracted. Under the previous process,
providers had to make a new bid with lower prices after
which the cheaper provider was contracted.
However, it remains difﬁcult to compare the quality of
service delivery by providers. Until now, the selection pro-
cedure focuses more on input related factors, e.g., share
of certiﬁed doctors, share of operating doctors in surgical
specialities, availability of nurse appointments, availability
of technologies and supportive services that are necessary
to provide care. Although the development of outcome
related criteria is a priority area and the HNDP hospitals
data on selected indicators are published regularly [9,10],
they are not yet in use for selection.
3. Preliminary results
The specialist care selection process was ﬁnalized by
the end of March 2014. EHIF selected providers for 18 spe-
cialties as well as for in-vitro fertilization, hemodialysis,
cataract surgery and endoprosthesis. In 2011 the EHIF had
to select specialist care in almost 40 geographical areas
compared to ‘only’ 15 counties in the new contract cycle
that started in 2014. The updated contracting procedure
better reﬂects population need in the country (and its coun-
ties), as historically there existed large regional disparities
between the numbers of provider and specialties available
per population. These were mostly the result of historical
supply side factors rather than differences in medical need.
Indeed, during the Soviet times each administrative unit
had a town with village hospital, which were later restruc-
tured into outpatient specialist policlinics. However many
of these towns have decreasing populations and may  no
longer be able to support a policlinic [11]. Deﬁning geo-
graphical areas for outpatient specialist care as counties
is in line with HNDP hospitals “catchment areas”. From
the provider perspective this made competition harder as
providers from smaller areas now had to compete on the
county levels with more providers and at least one HNDP
hospital.
As expected, the providers’ interest to supply services
was  much higher than EHIF’s ability to purchase and
therefore several providers were awarded lower volume
l surgery).
um points) Maximum points awarded if
Price reductions >10%
No penalties
No arrears of taxes
No corrective actions
No justiﬁed petitions
Data submitted to the E-Health system
All doctors certiﬁed
Contract includes outpatient and inpatient care
>90% of surgeons have performed surgeries
Above the average
>90% of doctors working in inpatient setting
Workload is 90–100% of optimal workload
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ontracts than applied for or received no contract. This was
specially the case in Tallinn and Tartu where relatively
any providers operate and competition for contracts is
trongest. In total, the EHIF contracted 58% of applied ser-
ice volume with 121 providers, 20% less providers than in
011.
. Impact on stakeholders
Financially, the impact on the EHIFs budget was
arginal as the capacity of the HNDP hospitals has been
ncreasing and thus the contract volume for selective con-
racting remains relatively small.
Even though the methodological basis for the new pro-
ess was transparent and in line with regulations ensuring
qual treatment of all providers applying for contracts,
rovider reactions were (unsurprisingly) mixed. Obvi-
usly the largest backlash was among those not receivingontracting process.
contracts. Especially those that were in counties where
HNDP hospitals had sufﬁcient capacity and no additional
contracting took place and thus had no chance to com-
pete for a contract. This happened for example to one
small private provider in Tartu, which previously delivered
approximately 100 childbirths per year. Some providers
urged patients to nevertheless ask for reimbursement of
care for which they did not receive a contract, hoping to
put pressure on the EHIF and the political system. Currently
there are no plans to support providers without contract
but the question may  come up when a new selection of
providers is planned.
The EHIF used local media and family doctors to inform
population. To mitigate the impact on patients, the EHIF
covers the treatment cost for people on waiting lists of
providers that have not received a contract in 2014. How-
ever, those not on waiting lists may  have to visit another
location than they were originally planning, possibly in
 Policy 
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another county. It therefore remains to be seen how
patients react in the longer term.
5. Conclusion
The EHIF’s objective in revising its selective contract-
ing policy has been to focus on patient needs rather than
historically developed provider capacity, which has led to
large disparities in distribution of providers and special-
ties and patient access. It is still too early to know the
long-term impact of the new contracting process, but some
ﬁrst observations can be made. First, one of the ongoing
debates at the court level is the EHIF’s ultimate right to
prefer HNDP hospitals and to contract them without fol-
lowing the same procedure as for all other providers. So
far the position of lower level courts has been favoring
this approach but the Supreme Court has not spoken on
this matter yet. Second, among HNDP hospitals, vertical
integration is favored and some ﬁrst results are already vis-
ible. Regional hospitals in practice get partial ownership in
general hospitals, leading to a higher concentration of spe-
cialist care. This can be seen as a positive trend – especially
in light of human resource shortages and the increasing role
of primary care. Third, the growing capacity of HNDP hospi-
tals combined with the preferential treatment they receive,
raises questions with regard to the future role of private
providers’ in Estonian health care. Fourth, many chal-
lenges remain in terms of purchasing on the basis of actual
population need and quality. The process of establishing
population need may  still be biased towards historical
supply factors and future reﬁnements in methodology
will be necessary to make better estimates. Moreover,
meaningful quality indicators need to be developed that
not only look at input or process but also at outcome.
Lastly, this innovation in contracting policy may  offer
valuable examples for other countries, especially those
making the transition from passive to active purchasers
and struggling with an unequal distribution of providers,
differences in access and fragmented care provision. This
seems to be particularly relevant for countries with a Soviet
legacy of central planning as well as many developing
countries [4,5].
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